Define the protected unit and neighboring datasets
Separate row, user, add/remove and replacement guarantees before calibrating noise.
On this page
The question for today
What you’ll understand
- State a differential-privacy guarantee over an explicit adjacency relation.
- Compare add/remove and replacement sensitivity of bounded vector sums.
- Explain why a row-level guarantee does not automatically give the same user-level budget.
Differential privacy constrains how much a randomized mechanism’s output distribution can change between neighboring datasets. The word neighboring defines the protected contribution. It can mean one record, all records from one user, or one bounded client update. A numerical epsilon without that relation is incomplete: protecting one sentence is different from protecting every sentence and device associated with the same person.
Adjacency determines the claim
Add/remove record adjacency compares datasets differing by one included record. Replacement adjacency compares equal-size datasets where one record is replaced. User-level add/remove adjacency removes all contributions belonging to one user under a declared identity policy. These relations are not interchangeable, even when they use the same raw table. Define whether public metadata such as an enrollment roster or a padded capacity is fixed across neighbors, and identify which actual participation information is included in the mechanism’s observable transcript.
For every ordered neighboring pair and measurable output event, the probability inequality must hold. Epsilon is a dimensionless multiplicative-loss parameter and delta is additive slack in that inequality. Delta should not be casually described as the probability that a particular person’s data is exposed. The guarantee limits distributional dependence; it does not promise that no sensitive population fact can be inferred. Encryption, access control and statistical privacy address different observations and can be needed together.
Bound the contribution for the chosen change
Suppose each independent record contributes a vector with Euclidean norm at most C and the query sums those vectors. Adding or removing one contribution changes the sum by at most C. Replacing one contribution by another changes it by at most 2C, because the two bounded vectors can point in opposite directions. These are worst-case bounds for this sum, not a rule that every scalar query has a factor-two difference. A correctness indicator in [0,1], for example, changes by at most one under replacement.
If a user contributes several clipped records, removing that user can remove several bounded vectors. Record clipping therefore does not itself bound the entire user contribution by C. One option is a public cap on records per user plus an appropriate group analysis; another is aggregating and clipping one whole user contribution. Identity linkage matters: treating two devices owned by the same person as unrelated privacy units does not establish a person-level claim. State the intended unit before selecting the sampler and accountant.
Translate guarantees carefully instead of relabeling them
Pure add/remove record-level epsilon-DP implies a k-epsilon group bound for datasets differing by at most k record additions or removals, by chaining neighboring datasets. That can give a user-level bound when every user has a proven contribution cap k, but it is weaker than the original epsilon claim. Approximate DP also accumulates delta through a group theorem, so merely multiplying epsilon and leaving delta unchanged is not generally valid. Without a bounded group size, no fixed small user-level budget follows from this simple translation.
The vectors lab can illustrate the sensitivity geometry. Reset and set both angle 0° and magnitude 2; predict vector (2,0). Separately Reset and set both angle 180° and magnitude 2; predict (-2,0). Their difference has norm four, while either vector alone has norm two. The instrument draws one deterministic vector at a time and performs no neighboring-dataset comparison or privacy accounting. Use the paper subtraction to distinguish removal from replacement, not to assign epsilon to a real learning system.
Work it through
One user can remove several bounded records
Let C=2 and consider record contributions (2,0) and (-2,0). A separate user owns three records, each contributing (2,0). Compare record add/remove, record replacement and removing that whole user. Also assume an independently established pure add/remove record-level epsilon=0.2 guarantee with a public three-record user cap.
Removing a single (2,0) contribution changes a sum by norm two, matching the add/remove sensitivity C. Replacing it with (-2,0) changes the sum by (-4,0), norm four, matching the possible replacement bound 2C.
Removing the user’s three aligned contributions changes the sum by (-6,0), norm six. Clipping each record to two therefore does not make the whole user’s contribution norm two; this example attains the simple three-record sum bound.
Under the separately stated pure-DP assumption, chaining at most three record-neighbor changes gives a user group bound of 3×0.2=0.6. It does not preserve epsilon=0.2, and this pure-DP arithmetic does not specify an approximate-DP delta translation.
Sensitivity and privacy-unit translation both depend on adjacency and contribution caps. The same record-level implementation cannot be renamed user-level with an unchanged budget.
The living notebook
Explore the model
Interactive lab · vectors
Opposite contributions expose replacement sensitivity
Reset → set angle 0° and magnitude 2 → predict (2,0). Separate Reset → set angle 180° and magnitude 2 → predict (-2,0). Subtract on paper to obtain a norm-four difference.
- x component
- 1.393
- y component
- 0.975
- Magnitude
- 1.7
Playback traces a fixed vector and its projections. Angle and magnitude set the geometry; the moving marker does not change them. Parameter changes pause playback and recompute the model at the current elapsed time. Reset restores both parameters and returns time to zero. Playback starts paused. Adjust either parameter, then choose Play or Step.
Look forThe single-vector geometry illustrates a worst-case difference. It contains no dataset, randomizer or privacy accountant.
Pause & reason
Check your understanding
Your turn
Try it yourself
A pure add/remove record-level guarantee has epsilon=0.1, and a proven public cap allows five records per user. Give the simple group epsilon bound. With C=3 and five aligned clipped records, how large can removing that user’s sum contribution be?
Take a moment to make a prediction or work it out on paper. Open a hint when you need one.
Give me a hint
Apply the record guarantee along a chain of at most five changes, and separately add the possible vector magnitudes.
Compare with the solution
The pure group bound is epsilon=5×0.1=0.5. Five aligned norm-three contributions can sum to norm fifteen, so the record clipping threshold is not a user-level norm-three bound. These conclusions require the five-record cap and do not provide an approximate-DP delta calculation.
Keep the idea
Take it with you
- A privacy statement specifies both the unit and the adjacency relation.
- Add/remove and replacement sensitivity can differ for bounded vector sums.
- Record protection becomes user protection only through an appropriate contribution and accounting analysis.
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